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原告追討疏忽賠償,被告曾開出10,000元和解建議,原告兩...

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發表於 2024-9-24 11:28:34 | 顯示全部樓層 |閱讀模式
原告追討疏忽賠償,被告曾開出10,000元和解建議,原告兩年後才決定收取10,000元,最終要承擔訟費。

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=153651&QS=%2B%7C%28DCPI%2C939%2F2021%29&TP=JU

以下為中文譯本


簡介
1.     這是被告對地方法院規則第22條第20(1)條規定下命令的法官決定提出的上訴。
2.     上訴的核心問題是是否存在特殊情況,足以使法院援引“否則條款”,使原告在2021年1月27日之後,即被告提出訴前要約28天後,對其普通法索賠的費用負責。
[color=rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.894)]背景
3.     原告受僱於被告擔任廚師。2018年4月12日,她在慈雲山日間護理中心的廚房彎腰撿垃圾桶時據稱受了背部傷害(“事故”)。
4.     2019年3月28日,原告對被告提起了僱員賠償訴訟(“僱員賠償訴訟”)。該訴訟於2020年3月13日以同意令的方式結案,金額為280,000港元。
5.     2020年12月30日,被告提出以10,000港元全額和最終解決原告的普通法索賠和費用(“訴前要約”)。
6.     2022年4月26日,被告向法院支付了10,000港元的制裁付款(“制裁付款”),包括利息,但不包括原告已經收到的僱員賠償。被告在同日的信中表示,如果原告接受制裁付款,被告將請求法院根據原告應接受訴前要約而不是提起人身傷害訴訟的理由來變更費用命令。
7.     2022年5月25日,經過數輪不具偏見的通信後,原告通過信件拒絕了制裁付款,並最終提出了125,000港元加費用的反要約。這被被告拒絕。被告堅持其10,000港元的訴前要約。
8.     2022年10月25日,原告根據地方法院規則第22條第15及20條提出傳票,要求超時接受10,000港元的制裁付款,並要求原告在2022年6月28日之前的費用,之後不作費用命令(“傳票”)。
9.     2022年11月15日,法官潘多明(“法官”)准許原告超時接受制裁付款。法官指示雙方提交和送達關於費用爭議的宣誓書和書面陳述。法官進一步指示,該事項將以書面處理方式處理,無需口頭聆訊。



  • 202352日,法官作出書面裁決(裁決)並作出以下命令:
(1) 被告須支付原告截至2022年6月28日(即可在無需法院許可的情況下接受制裁付款的日期)為止的訴訟費用,如未能達成協議,則按地方法院的標準徵稅;以及
(2) 原告須支付被告自2022年6月29日起的訴訟費用,包括傳票引起的費用,如未能達成協議,則按地方法院的標準徵稅(“命令”)。

  • 被告於202358日提交的針對裁決的上訴通知中,對命令第(1)項提出上訴,理由是:(i) 原告的索賠注定失敗;以及(ii) 她應該接受訴前提議。被告還主張,原告應因其索賠缺乏實質性依據以及拒絕訴前提議但接受制裁付款的無理行為而被處以費用懲罰,因為(i) 原告的索賠因證據不足而注定失敗;以及(ii) 訴前提議和制裁付款的金額基本相同,因此原告應該一開始就接受前者。
  • 原告的立場是:(i) 法院未提供足夠的材料,法院的職能不是對被告提出的原告的差異和可信度進行小型審判;以及(ii) 訴前提議和制裁付款並不相同,因為前者包括費用,而後者不包括。
適用的法律原則

  • 《民事訴訟規則》第22條第20(1)款規定:
“(1) 如果被告的制裁提議或制裁付款在無需法院許可的情況下被接受,原告有權獲得其訴訟費用,直至接受通知送達之日,除非法院另有命令。”

  • 上述規則規定,在接受制裁付款後,原告有權獲得其訴訟費用,直至接受通知送達之日。但在有明顯需要不同費用命令的特殊情況下,法院可以另行命令,這一初步規則可能被推翻(例外條款)。在本案中,被告在作出制裁付款時警告原告將申請援引例外條款。
討論
(i) 注定失敗的觀點

  • 雖然表面上這個案件仍處於非常早期的階段,但我認為法院仍然可以初步判斷該索賠是否應該一開始就進行,這是法院的自由裁量權範疇。
  • 被告的主張是,這一觀點有兩個方面,涉及(i) 被告的可信度,即她的傷害是否由她提起垃圾桶的行為引起;以及(ii) 提起所謂10公斤垃圾桶的簡單性質,使得原告的索賠注定失敗。

  • 法官在判決第41-42段中認為,由於尚未交換證人陳述書和未進行文件披露,對案件的優劣進行初步評估等同於在沒有足夠材料的情況下進行小型審訊。
  • 被告方的何先生澄清,他並不是要求法院對案件作出初步結論,即被告是否對原告的指控完全負責並評估相關損害賠償。而是,他在陳述中指出,法院可以且應該根據原告的指控來評估該索賠是否應該提出。
  • 《高等法院規則》第62令第5(1)(e)條規定:
“(1) 法院在行使其關於訟費的酌情權時,應在適當情況下考慮——(2008年第153號法律公告)
(e) 所有當事人的行為;(2008年第153號法律公告)”

  • 同一條令的第5(2)(a)條規定:
“(2) 就第(1)(e)段而言,當事人的行為包括——
(a) 當事人提出、追求或爭辯某一特定指控或問題是否合理;”

  • 何先生提交,法院有責任行使其訟費酌情權,確保案件迅速且經濟有效地處理。評估原告提出當前索賠是否合理屬於此範疇,可以通過考慮原告根據其陳述的最佳情況來進行。
  • 何先生進一步提交,即使假設所有證據對原告有利,即她的傷害是由於撿起垃圾桶所致(最佳情況),這仍然是一個沒有任何殘疾的成年人可以完成的日常任務。
  • 我同意何先生的陳述。
  • 我認為,當原告發出傳票和/或送達訴狀時,根本沒有足夠的證據支持她的普通法索賠。當提出訴前要約時,原告及其律師應該知道普通法索賠的事實和法律依據,他們肯定有足夠的材料仔細考慮並決定是否接受要約。然而,原告未能提供任何合理的解釋來拒絕訴前要約。相反,她選擇在非常薄弱的事實基礎上提起當前訴訟,指控被告的過失和違反職責導致她受傷,而幾乎沒有任何證據支持她的索賠。
  • 僅僅6個月後,原告接受了制裁付款,我注意到這僅是她在損害賠償聲明中最初索賠的1%。到那時,已經產生了很多不必要的費用。原告將她改變主意歸因於這段時間內她的心理健康狀況下降。我不認為這是一個有效的理由,因為所有訴訟當事人都會經歷壓力及其對心理狀況的影響,更不用說沒有同時期的醫療報告/證據來證實她的這一說法。
  • 基於上述情況,對於原告的法律代表而言,在我看來,這是一個典型的非法律援助原告希望放風箏並試探被告(或其保險公司)是否願意支付比她已經通過工傷賠償(在本案中為港幣280,000元)獲得的更多賠償的案例。
27.  所有經驗豐富的人身傷害(“PI”)律師都知道《僱員補償條例》(第282章)下提供的無過錯、基於法定且迅速處理的僱員補償(EC)索賠與普通法索賠之間的根本區別。在普通法索賠中,原告需承擔舉證責任,以證明雇主存在過失和/或違反了雇傭合同的默示條款和/或違反了法定義務。僅僅因為事故發生在工作過程中並且由工作引起,並不一定意味著索賠人可以在普通法訴訟中對雇主提出訴訟。在每個案件中,索賠人需承擔舉證責任,以平衡概率來證明事故是由於雇主的某些過失或違反義務而發生的。
28.  近年來,我發現香港的人身傷害訴訟中存在一種不健康的趨勢,在許多案件中,索賠人很可能在其法律顧問的幫助和鼓勵下,與EC訴訟同時或在EC訴訟結束後不久,提起平行的普通法訴訟,無論是否有任何事實或法律依據支持任何違反義務的行為。通常,他們會在追求EC索賠的同時,暫時擱置普通法索賠。而當EC索賠即將解決或即將審判時,索賠人的律師會突然提出普通法索賠進行案件管理或審判,從而在過程中產生大量不必要(且經常是重複)的費用。
29.  在我看來,這種做法是無益的,並使人身傷害訴訟,特別是地方法院的小額索賠,變得不必要地漫長和昂貴。在某些案件中,幾乎沒有證據支持事故是由雇主的過失和/或違反義務(無論是合同義務還是法定義務)引起的。而在那些有充分證據追求普通法索賠的案件中,索賠人(及其律師)寧願將案件“擱置”一旁,等待EC索賠結束後再繼續追求普通法索賠,從而導致大量不必要和重複的費用。
30.  EC法官和我都認為這種做法相當不滿意。現在要求各方在EC訴訟的早期案件管理階段聲明是否有任何因同一工作相關事故而產生的平行/相關普通法訴訟。法院現在將通過指示聽證會、案件管理會議或審前審查聽證會來處理這些索賠,以確保因同一工作事故而產生的EC和普通法索賠能夠迅速處理,並且各方無需產生重複和不必要的費用。法院還將努力確保這些案件能夠以高效和成本效益的方式進行,以實現《民事司法改革》的基本目標。

  • 在我判斷,原告在發出前行動信時支持普通法索賠的證據,充其量是微弱的,最糟糕的是不存在的。
  • 以下是原告在本案發出訴狀前對事故的描述摘要。
  • 事故發生6天後,原告於2018418日簽署了一份事故報告(事故報告),描述了她受傷的情況:
“本人是日上班時間是八點正,本人於七時五十到中心廚房更換衣服後便進行浸洗蔬菜工作,先洗旺菜,逐包於放在地上的菜籬提取打開,把旺菜放入兩個鋅盆進行浸洗工作,完成清洗旺菜後便洗白菜。浸洗第一輪白菜,便進行第二輪。當第二輪白菜正在浸的時候,本人從身後取那個空菜籬欲叠在近廚房後門口旁的三個已叠好空菜籬上,但因已叠好的三個菜籬在最高一格放了裝菜的膠袋和少許垃圾,於是我在身後取了一個空菜籬放在三個巳叠好空菜籬旁,便躬身向三個已叠好空菜籬最頂的空菜籬取裝菜膠袋和少許垃圾之時,背部脊椎骨尾位突然有像針刺痛,我便到廚房後門外靠牆站,期望可舒緩一些,不久,工友陳敏上班經過,便向本人了解甚麼事,之後問本人是否需協助扶入內休息,本人告知不用,但請陳敏搬開仍放在地上那一個空菜籬,以免阻礙陳敏進入廚房。” [強調添加]

  • 在支持傳票的原告宣誓書中,原告並未否認她簽署了事故報告。她也沒有暗示事故報告的內容是錯誤的。
  • 原告因事故對被告提起了勞工賠償訴訟。根據申請(由原告於2019328日簽署的真實陳述確認),事故發生在以下情況下:
“2018年4月12日,在受僱於被告期間,申請人被分配到早班工作。由於香港聖公會慈雲山長者日間護理中心(“現場”)通常工作空間不足,申請人不得不因現場有限的工作空間而搬動不同的物品。
大約在08:30,申請人彎腰撿起一個巨大的蔬菜容器以清除裡面的垃圾(“蔬菜籃”)。當申請人彎腰時,她的腰部和背部嚴重受傷,以至於之後無法站直(“事故”)。” [強調添加]

  • 2019819日,原告由雙方共同委任的骨科專家檢查。骨科專家記錄了原告對事故的描述如下:
“39. 陳女士自願提供了2018年4月12日早上8點過後受傷的歷史。她彎腰提起一個約5公斤重的垃圾籃時,起身時感到背部有劇烈的刺痛。她說雙下肢也有麻木感,直到腳趾。” [強調添加]

  • 然而,當原告開始本案訴訟時,很明顯原告試圖通過添加一些新的事實元素來潤飾她的索賠,以支持她的普通法索賠。
  • 原告於202141日發出本案訴狀,並於2022414日提交了訴狀。在訴狀的第1617段中,原告主張:
“16. 在相關時間,每個空菜籃重約5公斤,長24英寸,寬17英寸,高12英寸。至於裝有垃圾袋的頂部菜籃,其重量約為10公斤。

  • 在事故發生當天大約08:30,原告打算彎腰撿起頂部裝有垃圾袋的菜籃,該菜籃距地面約1.5英尺(因其堆放在其他3個空菜籃上)。在此過程中,原告嚴重扭傷和/或受傷了腰部和背部(事故)。” [強調添加]
39.  在2022年10月25日提交的宣誓書中,原告表示她在“自己清洗和處理4個大尺寸的蔬菜箱(約24英寸長,17英寸寬,12英寸高)”時嚴重傷到了背部。原告並未提及她曾經抬起這些箱子。
40.  因此,即使接受原告的最高說法,即她曾短時間內抬起一個10公斤的箱子(鑑於她之前的陳述,我非常懷疑這是否屬實),在我看來,這不過是一個我們日常生活中經常進行的簡單任務,就像做家務或在辦公室進行簡單的搬運工作一樣。這本身並不表明雇主在普通法上的任何義務違反:例如參見Li Wai Kin v Ready Chance Limited,未報導,HCPI 466 of 2008(Chung J;2010年4月27日)第29-31段。
41.  因此,根據原告在預行動信函日期的指控,我認為原告聲稱事故是由於被告違反普通法或法定義務所致,幾乎沒有或根本沒有事實依據。
42.  在本案中,我發現原告或至少是那些建議她的人,清楚地知道她幾乎沒有或根本沒有事實依據來提出普通法索賠。然而,在被告於2020年12月30日提出預行動提議後,原告仍堅持進行本訴訟。在被告自提議提出之日起一直拒絕改變立場後,原告變得相當絕望。這可以從2021年2月至2022年5月期間的無偏見談判中看出,原告通過不少於5-6封信件,願意接受125,000港元的金額,而最初要求的金額為550,000港元,以解決普通法索賠(扣除280,000港元的EC付款)。儘管被告在此事上的立場非常堅定,原告仍然認為有必要發出傳票,提交和送達本案的SOC和SOD,從而在此過程中產生了許多不必要的費用。
43.  我還應注意,原告曾於2022年3月8日申請法律援助,導致案件自動暫停至2022年5月31日。不出所料,她的法律援助申請於2022年6月20日被法律援助署署長拒絕。
44.  基於上述情況,我毫不懷疑,即使法院接受原告的最高主張,原告的案件也必然會失敗。在我看來,法院根本不需要根據本案中的證人陳述、發現的文件等來評估證人的可信度。
45.  然而,在我離開這個問題之前,我想將本案與我最近在Tsang Mei v Hospital Authority,未報導,DCPI 469/2021(AndrewLi;2023年5月11日)中的判決區分開來,被告的律師在其骨架第24段中試圖依賴該判決來支持在沒有任何證人陳述、文件發現和專家證據的情況下,可以在訴訟開始前形成初步觀點的主張。
46.  我對此不同意何律師的看法。
47.  在Tsang Mei案中,關鍵問題是原告是否有理由中止審判並不對被告的訴訟費用負責,法院是否應允許原告接受超過3年期限的制裁付款。
48.  在Tsang Mei案中,由於在審前審查階段有足夠的材料,我形成了對案件責任的初步看法。然而,在本案中,我同意原告的律師葉律師的看法,法院根本沒有足夠的材料來形成這樣的看法。

  • 本案的主要區別在於,法院無需根據所有證人陳述、發現的文件等形成對索賠的初步結論,而可以簡單地依賴原告對事故的自述。因此,即使將原告的指控視為最高,我認為原告也沒有足夠的證據對被告提起普通法索賠。因此,在我看來,她的普通法索賠必然會失敗。
(ii) 相同的報價點

  • 我認為,即使包括各自的費用,前行動報價和制裁付款中所述的金額在實質上也是相同的,因為接受制裁付款10,000港元所產生的費用預計將以類似於小額索賠法庭可收回的費用的稅率徵稅,即在本案中價值最小,因為在法庭程序中不允許有法律代表(因此沒有律師費用)。
  • 法官在決定的第3637段中認為,前行動報價(10,000港元全包報價)和制裁付款(10,000港元並警告變更費用命令)是不同的,因為法院應考慮費用條款,而不是僅僅看面值。
  • 不幸的是,我發現自己無法同意法官的觀點。
  • 毫無爭議的是,一旦根據《民事訴訟規則》第22條第20條接受制裁報價,費用權利就會內置於制裁報價的計算中,前行動報價和制裁付款的金額都應包括其費用。我同意葉先生在其大綱第35段中的觀點,即在本案中,前行動報價包括費用,而制裁付款則不包括。
  • 但我認為相同的報價點這個術語具有誤導性。正如被告在其大綱第27段中正確指出的那樣,法律並不要求前行動報價和制裁付款在所有方面都相同,以便被告能夠尋求費用,如在Wong Ka Chi v Cheung Li Glass Engineering Co Ltd and     Another一案中所見,未報告,DCPI 2013/2014Andrew Li2015324日),儘管費用不同,但報價和制裁付款被認為是相同條款。根本的測試是金額是否在實質上相同,以至於構成例外情況,從而證明偏離《民事訴訟規則》第22條第20(1)條的表面規則是合理的。
  • 我接受被告的觀點,即制裁付款和包括費用的前行動報價在實質上是相同的,因為即使接受前者的最有利費用命令,理論上也不會比後者好多少。
  • Ku Suet Yu, Amy v J.V. Fitness Limited Trading as California Fitness一案中,未報告,HCPI 266/2015(法官Roy Yu201625日),法官在決定的第36(f)段中引用,原告辯稱前行動報價與制裁付款不相同,因為訴訟是在高等法院提起的,她必須有權按照高等法院的標準徵稅,實際上,由於制裁付款金額在地方法院的管轄範圍內,費用可能會按照地方法院的標準徵稅。
  • 原告的葉先生在其大綱中依賴我在Alam Zafar v Cheuk Fung Engineering Company Limited     [2022] 5 HKLRD 978一案中的另一個最近判決第40-43段,強調確定費用標準的測試是,在提起訴訟時,原告是否有理由在地方法院而不是小額索賠法庭提起索賠。
58. 在Alam Zafar案中,儘管索賠金額在小額錢債審裁處的管轄範圍內,但法院認為原告的索賠更適合在地方法院審理。但我必須指出,該案是高度事實特定的,並根據該案的獨特情況作出決定。
59. 在我的判斷中,本案與Alam Zafar案有以下區別:

  • 本案中提供的10,000港元遠低於Alam Zafar案中裁定的63,340港元;
  • 本案中已經提出了訴訟前的和解建議和制裁付款,而Alam Zafar案中沒有;
  • Alam Zafar案中的事故事實爭議很大,主要涉及各方證人的可信度。本案中的主要爭議事實上是原告是否因提起籃子而受傷。但如上所述,即使所有證據對她有利,責任已經確定,原告的索賠也是微不足道的。與Alam Zafar案不同,這樣的事項不需要律師在審判中辯論。
60. 根據上述情況並應用Ku Suet Yu, Amy案中的原則,我認為原告的訴訟費用可能會被裁定為與小額錢債審裁處可追回的費用相似,這可能會像被告在其提交的第32段中所指出的那樣是最小的,因為(i)在EC訴訟中所有的基礎工作都已完成;(ii)在訴訟前和解建議提出時的任何額外步驟都只是訴訟前信件,根據實務指引18.1,這些信件不能在小額錢債審裁處的範圍內索賠。這導致訴訟前和解建議和制裁付款的金額差異最小,根據微不足道原則可以忽略不計。
61. 事實上,通過進行索賠,原告已經產生了進一步的重大費用,包括發出傳票、準備SOC、SOD以及提交和送達所有這些文件,這些費用遠遠超過了她在制裁付款提出後6個月願意接受的10,000港元。我看不出為什麼原告不應該在一開始就接受訴訟前和解建議。我也看不出為什麼她不應該承擔選擇在6個月後接受制裁付款(該金額與訴訟前和解建議完全相同)的費用後果。
結論
62. 總結而言,根據上述發現,我認為原告應承擔2021年1月27日之後的費用,因為她應該在那時接受訴訟前和解建議,因為(i)她的索賠事實基礎非常薄弱,我認為必然會失敗;(ii)訴訟前和解建議與制裁付款在實質上是相同的。
命令
63. 在上述前提下,我將允許被告的上訴,撤銷2023年5月2日的法官命令,並以以下內容取而代之:

  • 撤銷並變更決定第49(1)段至以下程度:

        
    • 被告支付原告截至2021127日(含當日)的訴訟費用,如果未能達成協議,則按小額錢債審裁處可追回的費用標準進行評稅;
        
    • 原告支付被告自2021128日起的訴訟費用,如果未能達成協議,則按地方法院標準進行評稅;
  • 上訴費用(包括法官前的傳票費用)由原告支付給被告,並附律師證書,如果未能達成協議,則進行評稅。
64. 我以臨時性質作出上述費用命令。如果雙方在14天內沒有申請變更,費用命令將成為最終命令。
65. 我還要感謝雙方律師的有益提交。
DCPI 939/2021
[2023] HKDC 934
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 939 OF 2021
---------------------------
BETWEEN
CHAN FUNG YU ANJI (陳豐裕)
Plaintiff
and
HONG KONG SHENG KUNG HUI WELFARE COUNCIL LIMITED
(香港聖公會福利協會有限公司)
Defendant
---------------------------
Before:His Honour Judge Andrew Li in Chambers
Date of Hearing:15 June 2023
Date of handing down Decision:7 July 2023
---------------------------------------------
DECISION
---------------------------------------------

[size=1em]INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the defendant’s appeal against a master’s decision for an order made under Order 22, rule 20(1) of the Rules of the District Court (“the RDC”).
2.  The core issue on appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances which warrant the court to invoke the “otherwise proviso”, such that the plaintiff is liable for the costs after 27 January 2021, ie 28 days after the pre-action offer has been made by the defendant, for her common law claim.

[size=1em]BACKGROUND

3.  The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a cook. On 12 April 2018, she allegedly suffered a back injury while bending down to pick up a bin in the kitchen of Tsz Wan Shan Day Care Centre which was run by the defendant (“the Accident’).
4.  On 28 March 2019, the plaintiff commenced employees’ compensation proceedings against the defendant (“the EC Action”). It was settled by a Consent Order dated 13 March 2020 for a sum of HK$280,000.
5.  On 30 December 2020, the defendant offered HK$10,000 in full and final settlement of the plaintiff’s intended common law claim and costs (“the Pre-Action Offer”).
6.  On 26 April 2022, the defendant made a sanctioned payment of HK$10,000 into the court (“the Sanctioned Payment”) which was inclusive of interest but not the employees’ compensation which had already been received by the plaintiff. The defendant indicated in a letter on even date that if the plaintiff accepts the Sanctioned Payment, the defendant shall invite the court to vary the costs order on the basis that the plaintiff should have accepted the Pre-Action Offer instead of commencing the PI action.
7.  On 25 May 2022, after several rounds of without prejudice correspondence, the plaintiff rejected the Sanctioned Payment via letter and ultimately made a counteroffer of HK$125,000 plus costs. This was rejected by the defendant. The defendant stood firm on their Pre-Action Offer at HK$10,000.
8.  On 25 October 2022, the plaintiff took out a summons under O 22 rr 15 & 20 of the RDC to accept the Sanctioned Payment at HK$10,000 out of time with costs to the plaintiff up to 28 June 2022, and no order as to costs thereafter (“the Summons”).
9.  On 15 November 2022, Master Dominic Pun (“the Master”) granted leave to the plaintiff to accept the Sanctioned Payment out of time. Directions were given to the parties to file and serve affirmations and written submissions over the arguments on costs. The Master further directed that the matter will be dealt with by way of paper disposal without an oral hearing.
10.  On 2 May 2023, the Master handed down a written decision (“the Decision”) and made the following order:-
(1) The defendant do pay the plaintiff the costs of this action up to and inclusive of 28 June 2022 (ie the day which the Sanctioned Payment could have accepted without leave of the court), to be taxed if not agreed at the District Court scale; and
(2) The plaintiff do pay the defendant costs of this action from 29 June 2022, including the costs of and occasioned by the Summons, to be taxed if not agreed at the District Court scale (“the Order”).
11.  By way of a notice of appeal against the Decision dated 8 May 2023, the defendant appeals against §(1) of the Order on the basis that (i) the plaintiff’s claim is doomed to fail; and (ii) she should have accepted the Pre-Action Offer. The defendant also submits that the plaintiff should be penalized for costs for the lack of merits of her claim and her unreasonable behavior of rejecting the Pre-Action Offer but accepting the Sanctioned Payment, since (i) the plaintiff’s claim was doomed to fail due to insufficient evidential basis; and (ii) the amounts of the Pre-Action Offer and the Sanctioned Payment was materially identical such that the plaintiff should have accepted the former in the first place.
12.  The plaintiff’s position is that (i) the court is not supplied with sufficient materials and it is not the court’s function to conduct a mini-trial of the discrepancies and credibility of the plaintiff raised by the defendant; and (ii) the Pre-Action Offer and the Sanctioned Payment are not identical since the former is inclusive of costs while the latter is not.

[size=1em]APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

13.  Order 22, rule 20(1) of the RDC states:-

“(1) Where a defendant’s sanctioned offer or sanctioned payment to settle the whole claim is accepted without requiring the leave of the Court, the plaintiff is entitled to his costs of the proceedings up to the date of serving notice of acceptance, unless the Court otherwise orders.”

14.  The above rule states that upon acceptance of the sanctioned payment, the plaintiff is entitled to his costs of the proceedings up to the date of serving notice of acceptance. But this prima facie rule may be displaced when the court orders otherwise when there are exceptional circumstances that clearly warrant a different costs order (“the Otherwise Proviso”). This is invoked by the defendant in this case with a warning to the plaintiff at the time of making the Sanctioned Payment that the defendant will apply to invoke the Otherwise Proviso.

[size=1em]DISCUSSION

[size=1em](i) Doomed to Fail Point

15.  Although on the surface this case is still at a very early stage, I find that the court can still form a preliminary view on whether the claim should have been proceeded in the first place and it is a matter that falls within the court’s discretion.
16.  It is the defendant’s case that there are two limbs to this point, relating to (i) the defendant’s credibility on whether her injury was caused by her act of lifting the bin; and (ii) the simple nature of the act of lifting the alleged 10kg bin, such that the plaintiff’s claim is doomed to fail.
17.  The Master in §§41-42 of the Decision held that since there have not been exchange of witness statements and no discovery of documents, to form a preliminary view on the merits of the case would be tantamount to conducting a mini-trial on affidavits without sufficient materials.
18.  Mr Leon Ho for the defendant clarifies that he is not asking the court to form a preliminary conclusion on the case, ie whether the defendant is wholly liable for allegations made by the plaintiff and to assess the relevant damages. Instead, in his submissions, the court can and should evaluate whether the claim should be raised in the first place based on the plaintiff’s own allegations.
19.  Order 62, rule 5(1)(e) of the RDC states:-

“(1) The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account – (L.N. 153 of 2008)

(e) the conduct of all the parties; (L.N. 153 of 2008)

20.  Rule 5(2)(a) of the same Order states:-

“(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(e), the conduct of the parties includes –

(a) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;”

21.  Mr Ho submits that it is the court’s responsibility to exercise its discretion as to costs and ensure that the case is expeditiously and cost-effectively dealt with. Assessing whether it is reasonable for the plaintiff to raise the present claim falls under such scope and can be done by considering the best-case scenario for the plaintiff according to the pleaded case.
22.  Mr Ho further submits that assuming all evidence is in favour of the plaintiff, such that her injury was caused by picking up the bin (the best-case scenario), it is still an everyday task that an adult without any disabilities can perform.
23.  I agree with Mr Ho’s submissions on this.
24.  I find there was simply insufficient evidence for the plaintiff to pursue her common law claim when she issued the writ and/or serving the statement of claim (“SOC”). When the Pre-Action Offer was made, the plaintiff and her solicitors should have known the factual and legal basis of the common law claim and they certainly have sufficient materials before them to carefully consider and to decide whether to accept the offer or not. However, the plaintiff failed to provide any plausible explanation for her rejection of the Pre-Action Offer. Instead, she chose to issue the present proceedings on a very weak factual foundation, alleging negligence and breach of duty on the part of the defendant which have allegedly caused her injury when there was hardly any evidence to support her claim.
25.  Only 6 months later the plaintiff accepted the Sanctioned Payment, which I note is only at 1% of what she has initially claimed under the statement of damages (“SOD”). By that time, a lot of unnecessary costs had already been incurred. The plaintiff attributed her change of mind to her declining mental health condition during this period. I do not find that to be a valid reason since stresses and the effects they have on one’s mental condition are experienced by all litigants, not to mention the fact that there is no contemporaneous medical report/evidence to substantiate this claim of hers.
26.  Based on the above, with respect to the plaintiff’s legal representatives, it appears to me that this is a classic case of a non-legal aided plaintiff who wishes to “fly a kite” and to test the waters of whether the defendant (or its insurer) would be prepared to pay her more than what she had already been fairly compensated for by way of employees’ compensation (“EC”) (in this case at HK$280,000) in a work related accident.

[size=1em]A common problem in work related accidents

27.  All experienced personal injuries (“PI”) lawyers would know the fundamental difference between that of a no-fault, statutory based and expeditiously processed EC claim provided under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap.282 and that of a common law claim where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish there was negligence and/or breach of implied terms of the contract of employment and/or breach of statutory duties on the part of the employer. Just because an accident happened in the course of employment and arising out of the employment, it does not necessary mean that a claimant will have a case against the employer in a common law action. In each case, the claimant bears the burden of proof to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident occurred due to some fault(s) or breach of duties on the part of the employer.
28.  In recent years, I find there exists an unhealthy trend in PI litigation in Hong Kong where in a lot of the cases, the claimants would, most probably with the help and encouragement of their legal advisers, issue parallel common law proceedings alongside with the EC proceedings (whether at the same time or shortly after the settlement of the EC actions), when there is no sound factual or legal basis to support any breach of duties or not. Often, they will just hold the common law claim at bay while pursuing the EC claim. And when the EC claim is about to be settled or going to trial, the claimants’ lawyers would then suddenly bring up the common law claim for case management or trial, incurring a lot of unnecessary (and often duplicated) costs in the process.
29.  Such practice in my view is unhelpful and making PI litigation, particularly for those smaller claims in the District Court, unnecessarily prolonged and over costly. In some of those cases, there is hardly any evidence to support the accident was caused by the negligence and/or breach of duties on the part of the employer, whether contractual or statutory. And in those cases where there is good and solid evidence to pursue the common law claim, instead of prosecuting the claim with due diligence, the claimants (and their lawyers) would rather “park” the cases on one side and wait until the conclusion of the EC claims before they would continue to pursue the common law claim, resulting in a lot of unnecessary and duplicated costs.
30.  Both the EC Judge and I find such practice rather unsatisfactory. Parties are now requested to declare if they have any parallel/related common law proceedings arising out of the same work related accident at an early case management stage of the EC proceedings. The court will now bring up and deal with these claims by way of direction hearings, case management conferences or pre-trial review hearings in order to make sure that the EC and common law claims arising out of the same work accident will be dealt with expeditiously and without parties having the need to incur duplicated and unnecessary costs. The court will also try to make sure that those cases will be prosecuted in a time-efficient and costs-effective manner, in order to achieve the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform.

[size=1em]The evidence to support the common law claim in this case

31.  In my judgment, the evidence to support a common law claim at the time of issuance of the Pre-Action Letter by the plaintiff in this case was at best tenuous and at worst non-existence.
32.  The following is a summary of how the plaintiff had described the Accident prior to issuing of the writ in this case.
33.  6 days after the Accident, the plaintiff signed an incident report on 18 April 2018 (“the Incident Report”) to describe how she was injured:-

“本人是日上班時間是八點正,本人於七時五十到中心廚房更換衣服後便進行浸洗蔬菜工作,先洗旺菜,逐包於放在地上的菜籬提取打開,把旺菜放入兩個鋅盆進行浸洗工作,完成清洗旺菜後便洗白菜。浸洗第一輪白菜,便進行第二輪。當第二輪白菜正在浸的時候,本人從身後取那個空菜籬欲叠在近廚房後門口旁的三個已叠好空菜籬上,但因已叠好的三個菜籬在最高一格放了裝菜的膠袋和少許垃圾,於是我在身後取了一個空菜籬放在三個巳叠好空菜籬旁便躬身向三個已叠好空菜籬最頂的空菜籬取裝菜膠袋和少許垃圾之時背部脊椎骨尾位突然有像針刺痛,我便到廚房後門外靠牆站,期望可舒緩一些,不久,工友陳敏上班經過,便向本人了解甚麼事,之後問本人是否需協助扶入內休息,本人告知不用,但請陳敏搬開仍放在地上那一個空菜籬,以免阻礙陳敏進入廚房。” [emphasis added]

34.  In the plaintiff’s affirmations to support the Summons, the plaintiff did not dispute that she had signed the Incident Report. She also did not suggest that the contents of the Incident Report were wrong.
35.  The plaintiff commenced the EC Action against the defendant resulting from the Accident. According to the application (which was confirmed by a statement of truth signed by the plaintiff on 28 March 2019), the Accident took place under the following circumstances:-

“On 12th April 2018, while in the course employment with the Respondent, the Applicant was assigned to work the morning shift. Since there was generally not enough working space at H.K.S.K.H. Tsz Wan Shan Day Care Centre for the Elderly (“the Scene”), the Applicant had to lift and move different objects around due to the limited working space at the Scene.

At about 08:30 hours, the Applicant bent down in order to pick up a huge vegetables container so as to remove the rubbish inside (“the Vegetable Bin”). As the Applicant bent down, her waist and back were severely injured, such that the Applicant could not even stand right up afterwards (“the Accident”).” [emphasis added]

36.  The plaintiff was examined by orthopaedic experts jointly appointed by the parties on 19 August 2019. The orthopaedic experts recorded the plaintiff’s description of the Accident as follows:-

“39. Madam Chan volunteered a history of being involved in an injury on 12 Apr 2018 passed 8 am. She was bending forward to lift a basket of garbage about 5kg in weight, when she felt sharp piercing pain on her back upon getting up.  She said there was also bilateral lower limb numbness down to toes.” [emphasis added]

37.  However, by the time when the plaintiff commenced the present proceedings, it is clear that the plaintiff has tried to embellish her claim by adding some new factual elements to her case in order to support her common law claim.
38.  The plaintiff issued the writ of the present proceedings on 1 April 2021 and filed the SOC on 14 April 2022. In §§16 and 17 of the SOC, the plaintiff pleaded that:-

“16. At the material time, each empty Bin weighed approximately 5kg, measuring 24 inches in length, 17 inches in width and 12 inches in height. As for the top Bin that contained the Rubbish Bag with refuse inside, its weight would be approximately 10kg.

17. At about 08:30 hours on the date of the Accident, the plaintiff intended to bend down to pick up the top Bin with the Rubbish Bag inside which was measured about 1.5 feet tall from the floor (as it was stacked on top of the other 3 emptied Bins). In the course of doing so, the plaintiff sprained and/or injured her waist and back in a severe manner (the “Accident”).” [emphasis added]

39.  In the affirmation filed on 25 October 2022, the plaintiff said that she had injured her back severely while “washing and handling on her own some 4 big-size bins (around 24 inches in length, 17 inches in width and 12 inches in height) of vegetables.” The plaintiff did not mention the fact that she had lifted the bins.
40.  Hence, even if one accepts the plaintiff’s case at its highest, ie that she had lifted a bin of 10kg for a short time (which I very much doubt was the case in view of her previous accounts), this is in my view no more than a simple common daily task which we undertake all the time, just like doing a household chore or undertaking a simple lifting task in the office. This does not by itself indicate any breach of common law duty on the part of the employer: see for example Li Wai Kin v Ready Chance Limited, unreported, HCPI 466 of 2008 (Chung J; 27 April 2010) at §§29-31.
41.  Thus, based on the plaintiff’s own allegations as of the date of the Pre-Action Letter, it is clear in my judgment that there was no or hardly any factual foundation for the plaintiff to make the claim that the Accident was due to any breach of common law or statutory duties on the part of the defendant.
42.  In this case, I find that the plaintiff, or at least those advising her, knew well that there was no or hardly any factual basis for her to make a common law claim. Yet the plaintiff insisted to proceed with the present proceedings after the Pre-Action Offer was made by the defendant on 30 December 2020. The plaintiff then became rather desperate when the defendant refused to move from the Pre-Action Offer position at all since the date when it was made. This can be seen during the without prejudice negotiations between February 2021 and May 2022 when the plaintiff was, through no less than 5-6 letters, willing to accept a sum of HK$125,000 from the originally asking sum of HK$550,000, to settle the common law claim (which was net of the EC payment of HK$280,000). Despite of the defendant’s very firm stance on the matter, the plaintiff saw fit to issue the writ, file and serve the SOC and SOD in this case, incurring much unnecessary costs in the process.
43.  I should note here also that the plaintiff had tried to apply for legal aid on 8 March 2022 which caused the case to be automatically stayed until 31 May 2022. Unsurprisingly, her legal aid application was refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 20 June 2022.
44.  Based on the above, I have no doubt that the plaintiff’s case will bound to fail even if the court takes her claim to its highest. In my view, there is no need for the court to go into assessing the credibility of the witnesses based on the witness statements, discovered documents, etc. in this case at all.
45.  However, before I leave this issue, I would like to distinguish the present case from a recent decision of mine in Tsang Mei v Hospital Authority, unreported, DCPI 469/2021 (Andrew Li; 11 May 2023) that the defendant’s counsel tries to rely on in §24 of his skeleton to support the proposition that a preliminary view can be formed before commencement of proceedings in the absence of any witness statements, discovery of documents and expert evidence.
46.  I respectfully disagree with Mr Ho on this.
47.  In Tsang Mei, the key issue was whether it is just for the plaintiff to discontinue the trial and not be liable for the defendant’s costs of the proceedings by way of the court granting leave to the plaintiff to accept the sanctioned payment 3 years out of time.
48.  In Tsang Mei, I formed the preliminary views on the liability of the case since there were sufficient materials at the pre-trial review stage for me to do so. However, in this case, I would agree with Mr Ip for the plaintiff that there were simply insufficient materials for the court to form such a view.
49.  The main difference in the present case is that the court does not need to form a preliminary conclusion on the claim based on all the witness statements, discovered documents, etc., it can simply rely on the plaintiff’s own accounts in relation to the Accident. Thus, even taking the plaintiff’s allegations at its highest, I am of the view that there was simply insufficient evidence for the plaintiff to commence a common law claim against the defendant. As such, in my judgment, her common law claim is bound to fail.

[size=1em](ii) Identical Offer Point

50.  I am of the view that the amount stated in the Pre-Action Offer and the Sanctioned Payment are materially identical even when including their respective costs, since the costs resulting from the acceptance of the Sanctioned Payment at HK$10,000 are expected to be taxed at a rate similar to those recoverable at the Small Claims Tribunal, namely, of minimal value in this case as no legal representatives (hence no lawyers’ costs) will be allowed for proceedings in the tribunal.
51.  The Master in §§36 and 37 of the Decision held that the Pre-Action Offer (HK$10,000 all-inclusive offer) and the Sanctioned Payment (HK$10,000 with a warning to vary the costs order nisi) were different since the court should take into account the terms regarding costs instead of merely looking at the face value.
52.  Unfortunately, I find myself not able to agree with the Master on this.
53.  It is undisputed that costs entitlement is built into the calculation of the sanctioned offer once it is accepted under O22 r 20 of the RDC, and that both the amounts of Pre-Action Offer and Sanctioned Payment should be evaluated with their costs. I agree with Mr Ip in §35 his skeleton that in the present case, the Pre-Action Offer was inclusive of costs while the Sanctioned Payment was not.
54.  But the term “Identical Offer Point” in my view is misleading. As the defendant correctly identified in §27 of his skeleton, the law does not require the pre-action offer and the sanctioned payment to be identical in all aspects for the defendant to be able to seek costs, as seen in Wong Ka Chi v Cheung Li Glass Engineering Co Ltd and Another, unreported, DCPI 2013/2014 (Andrew Li; 24 March 2015) where the offer and the sanctioned payment were held to be in identical terms despite the differences in costs. The fundamental test is whether the amounts are so materially identical that it amounts to an exceptional circumstance justifying a departure from the prima facie rule in O 22 r 20(1) of the RDC.
55.  I accept the defendant’s submissions that the Sanctioned Payment and the Pre-Action Offer inclusive of costs are materially identical, since even the most favourable costs order upon acceptance of the former would not be materially better than the latter in theory.
56.  In Ku Suet Yu, Amy v J.V. Fitness Limited Trading as California Fitness, unreported, HCPI 266/2015 (Master Roy Yu; 5 February 2016) cited by the Master in §36(f) of the Decision, the plaintiff argued that the Pre-Action Offer was not identical to the Sanctioned Payment since the proceedings were brought in the High Court and she must be entitled to taxation at the High Court scale, and in fact the costs were likely to be taxed at the District Court level since the Sanctioned Payment amount was within the jurisdiction of the District Court.
57.  In his skeleton submissions, Mr Ip for the plaintiff relied on another recent judgment of mine in Alam Zafar v Cheuk Fung Engineering Company Limited [2022] 5 HKLRD 978 at §40-43 to emphasize that the test in determining the scale of costs is whether at the time of the commencement of action, it is reasonable for the plaintiff to have commenced the claim in the District Court instead of in the Small Claims Tribunal.
58.  In Alam Zafar, it was held that the plaintiff’s claim was more appropriate to be tried in the District Court even though the sum was within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal. But I have to point out that the case was highly fact-specific, and was decided upon the unique circumstances of that case.
59.  In my judgment, the present case can be distinguished from Alam Zafar with the following features:-
(1) the amount of HK$10,000 offered in the present case is much lower than the awarded sum in Alam Zafar (at HK$63,340);
(2) the Pre-Action Offer and the Sanctioned Payment had already been made in this case but not in Alam Zafar; and
(3) the facts of the accident in Alam Zafar were so heavily disputed that the main crux of the issue of liability involved the credibility of each parties’ witnesses. In this case, the main dispute in fact is whether the plaintiff injured her back from lifting the basket. But as mentioned above, the plaintiff’s claim is insubstantial even when all evidence is in favour of her and liability can already be determined. No lawyers are required to argue such matters at a trial, unlike in Alam Zafar.
60.  In my view, based on above and applying the principle in Ku Suet Yu, Amy, the plaintiff’s costs are likely to be awarded at a level similar to those recoverable at the Small Claims Tribunal, which is likely to be minimal as identified by the defendant in §32 of his submissions since (i) groundwork was all completed in the EC Action; and (ii) any extra steps by the time of the Pre-Action Offer would be the pre-action letter, which cannot be claimed at the Small Claims Tribunal scale under Practice Direction 18.1. This leads to a minimal difference in the amounts of the Pre-Action Offer and the Sanctioned Payment, which is negligible under the de minimis rule.
61.  In fact, by proceeding with the claim, the plaintiff has incurred further substantial costs by issuing the writ, preparing the SOC, SOD and filing and serving of all those documents which would far exceed the HK$10,000 she later was willing to accept out of time some 6 months after the Sanctioned Payment was made. I see no reason to why the plaintiff should not have accepted the Pre-Action Offer in the first place. I also see no reason why she should not take the consequences on costs by choosing to accept the Sanctioned Payment (which amount is exactly the same as that of the Pre-Action Offer) 6 months out of time.

[size=1em]CONCLUSION

62.  In summary, based on my above findings, I am of the view that the plaintiff should bear the costs after 27 January 2021, when she should have accepted the Pre-Action Offer since (i) her claim has a very weak factual basis which in my view bound to fail; and (ii) the Pre-Action Offer is materially identical to the Sanctioned Payment.

[size=1em]Order made

63.  In the aforestated premises, I would allow the defendant’s appeal and set aside the Master’s Order dated 2 May 2023 and substitute that with the following:-
(1) §49(1) of the Decision be set aside and varied to the extent that:-
(a) The defendant do pay the plaintiff the costs of this action up to and inclusive of 27 January 2021, to be taxed if not agreed on the scale similar to those recoverable at the Small Claims Tribunal; and
(b) The plaintiff do pay the defendant the costs of this action from 28 January 2021, to be taxed if not agreed at the District Court scale; and
(2) The costs of this appeal (including the costs of the Summons before the Master) be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.
64.  I make the above costs order on a nisi basis. In the absence of any application to vary the same by the parties within 14 days, the costs order will become absolute.
65.  It remains for me to thank counsel on both sides for their helpful submissions.


( Andrew SY Li )
District Judge

Mr Chris Ip instructed by Messrs Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin, for the plaintiff
Mr Leon Ho instructed by Messrs Zhong Lun Law Firm LLP, for the defendant



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